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This paper studies the properties of an economy subject to random liquidity shocks.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore [2008], liquidity shocks affect the ease with which equity can
be used as to ﬁnance the down-payment for new investment projects.
We obtain a liquidity frontier which separates the state-space into two regions (liquid-
ity constrained and unconstrained). In the unconstrained region, the economy behaves
according to the dynamics of the standard real business cycle model. Below the fron-
tier, liquidity shocks have the effects of investment shocks. In this region, investment
is under-efﬁcient and there is a wedge between the price of equity and the real cost of
capital.
As with investment shocks, we argue that liquidity shocks are not an important
source of business cycle ﬂuctuations in absence of other frictions affecting the labor mar-
ket.
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11 Overview
Motivation: This paper studies the role of liquidity shocks in a real business cycle framework.
Liquidity shocks are shocks to the fraction of assets that may be sold as in previous work
by Kiyotaki and Moore [2008] (henceforth KM). In conjunction with other ﬁnancial frictions,
these shocks are a potential source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Indeed, the recent ﬁnancial
crises has been attributed to a collapse in credit markets and, in particular, to a disruption in
the use of existing assets as collateral.
Motivated by these events, this paper studies the full stochastic version of the KM model
in order to provide further insights about liquidity shocks. Whereas most of the intuition in
KM still holds in a stochastic environment, this version uncovers some characteristics that
are not deduced immediately from the analysis around a non-stochastic steady-state. More
precisely, we ﬁnd that the state-space has two regions separated by a liquidity frontier. Each
region has the properties that KM ﬁnd for two distinct classes deterministic steady states.1
The region above the liquidity frontier is governed by the dynamics of real business cycle
model. In the region below the liquidity frontier, liquidity shocks (combined with limited
enforcement constraints) play the role of shocks to the efﬁciency of investment providing
an additional source of ﬂuctuations.2 This region is characterized by binding enforcement
constraints which render the competitive allocation of resources to investment projects in-
efﬁcient. Moreover, because in this region enforcement constraints are binding, this inefﬁ-
ciency shows up as a wedge between the replacement cost of capital and the price at which
equity (backed by capital) is traded. We interpret this wedge as Tobin’s q (henceforth, we
refer to this wedge simply a q). By characterizing the liquidity frontier, we are able to show
that liquidity shocks have stronger effects as the return to capital is high, either because the
capital stock is low or because productivity is high.
Liquidity: In the rest of the paper, liquidity is interpreted as a property of an asset: an
asset is liquid if gains from trade are sufﬁcient to guarantee trade. Liquidity shocks are
shocks to the fractions of assets which are liquid. The amount of liquidity is the fraction of
liquid assets.3
The role of liquidity: In the model, investment has two characteristics that cause liquid-
ity to become a source business cycle ﬂuctuations. First, access to investment projects is
limited to a fraction of the population. Second, investment is subject to moral-hazard so
optimal ﬁnancing requires a down-payment. The combination of these two characteristics
innus gains from trading previously existing assets: entrepreneurs want to sell these assets
to ﬁnance down-payments and, on the other hand, there is demand for these assets since not
every entrepreneur is capable of investing. Shocks to liquidity interrupt trade when there
are gains from trade.
The mechanism works in the following way. Due to moral hazard, in order to access
1By classes of steady states refers we mean steady states under different parameterizations of the model.
2Liquidity shocks in the model here deliver the same dynamics as shocks to investment efﬁciency as in
Barro and King [1984].
3Some authors use liquidity as a synonym of volume of trade. In the context of the model, the distinction
between liquid assets and traded assets is important. For example, there could be states in which in which
equity is entirely liquid but, on the other hand, it is not traded at all.
2external ﬁnancing, entrepreneurs are required to self-ﬁnance part of investment projects. To
relax their external ﬁnancing constraints, entrepreneurs can sell part of their assets. As in
KM, liquidity shocks arrive exogenously and affect the amount of assets that can be sold.
When liquidity is sufﬁciently low, it drives aggregate investment below efﬁcient levels be-
cause it reduces the entrepreneurs’ access to external ﬁnancing. Because there are less assets
sold (corresponding to projects in place), non-investing entrepreneurs are willing to supply
more funds for new investment projects. On the other hand, because they are selling less
assets (corresponding to older projects), investing entrepreneurs have less funds to ﬁnance
their down-payments. With more supply for outside ﬁnancing and less funds for internal
ﬁnancing, a wedge between the price of equity and the replacement cost of capital must oc-
cur to clear out the equity market respecting the limited enforcement constraints. Without
this wedge, the market for equity of new projects would clear at a level where incentive con-
straints are not satisﬁed. This wedge causes Tobin’s q to be different than one in some states.
For example, after a strong liquidity shock, aggregate investment falls and q increases.
Through this channel, liquidity shocks play a potential role as a direct source and ampli-
ﬁcation mechanism of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Natural questions are why and by how
much? This paper is aimed at answering them.
Quantitative Findings: The main quantitative result in the paper is that liquidity shocks on
their own may not explain strong recessions. In particular, we argue that one needs to innu
additional frictions on the labor market that interact with liquidity shocks in order to explain
sizeable recessions. Our calibration exercise is purposely designed in such a way that the
effects of liquidity shocks have the strongest possible effects. Nevertheless, when we study
the impulse response to an extreme event in which all assets become illiquid we ﬁnd that the
response of output is a drop in 0.7% relative to the average output. The response of output to
liquidity shocks is weak because liquidity shocks resemble investment shocks. Investment
shocks have weak effects in neoclassical environments because output is a function of the
capital stock which, in turn, moves very little in comparison to investment. This is the reason
why the bulk of business cycle studies focus on total factor productivity shocks.4 Moreover,
due to the non-linear nature of liquidity shocks, their effects on output are negligible if they
are not close to a full market shutdown.
To affect output in a stronger way, liquidity shocks must also affect labor input decisions.
One way to reproduce stronger effects is by introducing variable capital utilization as in
Greenwood et al. [1988] into the model. With variable capital utilization, entrepreneurs face
a trade-off between incrementing the utilization of capital and depreciating capital. When
liquidity is tight, the economy is inefﬁcient in allocating resources to investment. The op-
portunity cost of capital use increases. As a consequence, the utilization of capital and labor
demand fall with a drop in liquidity. We incorporate this mechanism into the model to ex-
plain how the effects of liquidity on output may be much larger if it also affects the labor
demand. The same calibration exercise with variable capital utilization has an effect close to
10 times as large.
We calibrate liquidity shocks in such a way that the effects are as large as possible. In
4This result is know in the literature at least since Barro and King [1984] and discussed recently in Justiniano
et al. [2010].
3the appendix, we derive the asset pricing properties of the model. When computing asset
prices, we ﬁnd that in order to obtain a reasonable mean and variance of the risk-free rate,
liquidity shocks must ﬂuctuate close to the liquidity frontier. If liquidity shocks fall too often
into the unconstrained region, the variation in q is too low. On the other hand, if liquidity
shocks fall deep inside the constrained region too often, risk free rates become excessively
volatile. This ﬁnding reinforces our claim that if liquidity shocks are to explain an important
part of the business cycle, they must also distort labor decisions.5
Related Papers. He and Krishnamurthy [2008] and Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2009]
study environments in which agents are heterogenous because some are limited in their ac-
cess to saving instruments (investment opportunities). Investment opportunities are also
illiquid assets because of hidden action (gains from trade don’t guarantee trade or interme-
diation). Thus, these papers focus on how a low relative wealth of agents with access to
these opportunities distorts the allocation of other entrepreneurs from investing efﬁciently.
Here we abstract from the importance of the relative wealth of agents but stress how the
liquidity shocks to existing assets affect the liquidity of investment projects by reducing the
amount available as collateral. Like us, these papers deliver regions of the state-space where
constraints prevent efﬁcient investment. These papers also stress the importance of global
methods in understanding the non-linear dynamics of these ﬁnancial frictions. This paper
complements that work as a step towards understanding how changes in liquidity (rather
than wealth) affect the allocation of resources to investment.
Another related paper is Lorenzoni and Walentin [2009]. In that paper, a wedge between
the cost of capital and the price of equity shows up as combination of limited access to
investment opportunities (gains from trade) and limited enforcement (the inefﬁciency that
prevents trade). Our papers share in common that investment is inefﬁcient due to lack of
commitment. In Lorenzoni and Walentin [2009] entrepreneurs may potentially default on
debt whereas in KM, agents can default on equity generated by new projects. Thus, as in
He and Krishnamurthy [2008] and Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2009], shocks propagate
by affecting the relative wealth of agents carrying out investment opportunities which is
something we abstract from. Our paper is related to theirs because both stress that the rela-
tion between q and investment is governed by two forces: shocks that increase the demand
for investment (e.g., an increase in productivity) will induce a positive correlation between
q and investment. The correlation moves in the opposite direction when the enforcement
constraints are more binding tighter (e.g., with a fall in liquidity).
Finally, del Negro et al. [2010] is the closest to our work. This paper innus nominal rigidi-
ties into the KM model. Nominal rigidities are an example of an ampliﬁcation mechanism
that our model is looking for in order to explain an important part of the business cycles.
That paper corroborates our ﬁnding that without such an ampliﬁcation mechanism, liquid-
ity shocks on their own, cannot have important implications on output. Our papers are
complementary as theirs tries to explain the recent ﬁnancial crises as caused by a strong
liquidity shock. The focus here is on studying liquidity shocks in an RBC. Other than that,
our paper differs from theirs because it studies the behavior of the model globally whereas
5Similar conclusions are found in Greenwood et al. [2000] or Justiniano et al. [2010] when studying random
investment speciﬁc shocks.
4theirs is restricted to a log-linearized version of the model. We believe that the ﬁndings in
both papers complement each other.
Organization: The ﬁrst part of the paper describes KM’s model and exploits an aggrega-
tion result to compute equilibria without keeping track of wealth distributions for a broad
class of preferences. The following sections characterize the main properties of the model.
We then discuss the business cycle implications and the effects of a strong liquidity dry-up
episode. A later section innus variable capital utilization and discusses the main implica-
tions. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper by proposing some challenges for future re-
search. In the appendix of the paper we describe some extensions to the model and its asset
pricing properties.
2 Kiyotaki and Moore’s Model
The model is formulated in discrete time with an inﬁnite horizon. There are two populations
with unit measure, entrepreneurs and workers. Workers provide labor elastically and don’t
save. Entrepreneurs don’t work but invest in physical capital which they use in privately
owned ﬁrms. Each period, entrepreneurs are randomly assigned one of either of two types,
investors and savers. We use superscripts i and s to refer to either type.
There are two aggregate shocks. A productivity shock A 2 A where A  R and a liquid-
ity shock  2   [0;1]. The nature of these shocks will affect the ability to sell equity and
will be clear soon. These shocks form Markov process that evolves according to stationary
transition probability  : (A)  (A) ! [0;1]. A and  satisfy:
Assumption 1. A; are compact.  has the Feller property.
Itwillbeshownthattheaggregatestateforthiseconomyisgivenbytheaggregatecapital
stock, K 2 K in addition to A and . K is shown to be compact later in the paper. The
aggregate state is summarized by a single vector s = fA;;Kg and s 2 S  A    K.
2.1 Preferences of Entrepreneurs
We follow the exposition of Angeletos [2007] for the description of preferences which are of
the class innud by Epstein and Zin [1989]. Preferences of entrepreneur of type j are given
recursively by:

















where the expectation is taken over time t information.6
6Utility in Epstein and Zin [1989] is deﬁned (equation 3.5) differently. This representation is just a monotone
transformation of the speciﬁcation in that paper. The speciﬁcation here is obtained by applying U 1 to that
equation .
5The term CE refers to the certainty equivalent utility with respect to the CRRA  trans-










 captures the risk-aversion of the agent whereas his elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is captured by :
2.2 Production
Entrepreneurs manage their ﬁrms efﬁciently. Each ﬁrm is run by using an idiosyncratic
capital endowment, k 2 [0;1]. Entrepreneurs increase a capital endowment via investment
projects. In addition, they purchase and sell equity from other entrepreneurs. Financial
trading is explained below.
At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs take the capital in their ﬁrms as given
and choose labor inputs, l, optimally to maximize proﬁts. Production is carried out accord-
ing to a Cobb-Douglas production function F (k;l)  kl(1 ); where  is the capital inten-
sity. Because the production function is homogeneous, maximization of proﬁts requires to















where w is the wage and A is the aggregate productivity shock.
2.3 Entrepreneur Types
Entrepreneurs are able to invest only upon the arrival of random investment opportunities.
Investmentopportunitiesaredistributedi.i.d. acrosstimeandagents. Aninvestmentoppor-
tunity is available with probability . Hence, each period, entrepreneurs are segmented into






t+1 = rtnt + qte
 
t+1 (1)
This budget is written in real terms. qt is the price of equity in consumption units. The
right hand side of 1 corresponds to the resources available to the entrepreneur. The ﬁrst
term is the return to equity holdings where rt is the return on equity and nt is the amount
of equity held by the entrepreneur. The second term in the right is the value of sales of
equity, e
 
t+1. This terms is the difference between the next period’s stock of equity e
 
t+1 and
the non-depreciated fraction of equity owned in the current period et: The entrepreneur
7The transformation (c) characterizes the relative risk aversion through 
 > 0: The function U (c) cap-
tures intertemporal substitution through  > 0. When 
 < 1, the second term in the utility function is
convex in V j(s0) and concave when the inequality is reversed: When 
 = 1
; one obtains the standard expected
discounted. If these terms are further equalized to 1, the speciﬁcation yields the log-utility representation.
6uses these funds to consume ct, to ﬁnance down payment for investment projects, id
t; and to
purchase outside equity e
+
t+1. Each unit of e
 




generated by other entrepreneurs. The net equity for each entrepreneur is therefore:





The difference between saving and investing entrepreneurs is that the former are not able to
invest directly. Thus, they are constrained to set id























t which is speciﬁed by the investment contract speciﬁed in the next section. Finally,
the timing protocol is such that investment decisions are taken at the beginning of each pe-
riod. That is, entrepreneurs choose consumption and a corporate structure before observing
future shocks.
2.4 Investment, optimal ﬁnancing and liquidity shocks
Investment opportunities and ﬁnancing. When an investment opportunity is available, en-
trepreneurs choose a scale for an investment project, it: Projects increment the ﬁrm’s capital
stock one for one with the size of the project. Each project is funded by a combination of
internal funding, id
t; and external funds if: External funds obtained by selling equity that
entitles other entrepreneurs to the proceeds of the new project. Thus, it = id
t +i
f
t : In general,
the ownership of capital created by this project may differ from the sources of funding. In
particular, investing entrepreneurs are entitled to the proceeds of a fraction ii
t of total invest-
ment, and the rest, is
t, entitles other entrepreneurs to those proceeds. Again, it = ii
t + is
t:
Because the market for equity is competitive and equity is homogeneous, the rights to
is
t are sold at the market price of equity qt: Therefore, external ﬁnancing satisﬁes if = qtis
t:
Notice that at the end of the period, the investing entrepreneur increases his equity in ii
t =
it   is
t while he has contributed only it   qtis
t. In addition, investment is subject to moral-
hazard because entrepreneurs may divert funds from the project. By diverting funds, they
are able to increment their equity stock up to a fraction 1  of the total investment without
honoring the fraction of equity sold. There are no enforcement or commitment technologies
available. The assumption that issues of new equity is subject to moral hazard as opposed
to equity in place is tries to capture the idea that ﬁnancial transactions on assets that are
already in place are more easily enforced than those on assets that don’t exist yet. In essence,
we assume that funds from existing physical capital may not be diverted. On the other
hand, one can interpret liquidity shocks also as stemming from a time varying version of
7constraints on existing assets.
Utility will be shown to be an increasing function of equity only. The incentive compati-
bility condition for external ﬁnancing is equivalent to:




t  it (5)
This condition states that the lender’s stake in the project may not be higher than .8
Therefore, taking id
t as given, the entrepreneur solves the following problem when it decides
how much to invest:















































The interpretation of this objective is clear. For every project, the investing entrepreneur
increases his stock of equity id
t + (qt   1)is
t; which is the sum of the down payment plus
the gains from selling equity corresponding to the new project, is
t. The constraint says that
the amount of outside funding is limited by the incentive compatibility constraint. As qt
is lower, the constraint on external funding is tighter, because the investing entrepreneurs
stake on the project is lower.






lem is maximized at the points where the incentive compatibility constraint binds. There-
fore, at this price range, for every unit of investment it, the investing entrepreneurs ﬁnances









8The distinction between inside and outside equity makes this a q-theory of investment. The wedge occurs
as a combination of two things. First, only a fraction  of agents have access to investment opportunities which
generates a demand for outside equity. Limited enforcement causes the supply of outside equity to be limited
by the incentive compatibility constraints. The value of q must adjust to equate demand with supply and this
price may differ from 1.
8qR
t is less than 1, when qt > 1 and equal to 1 when qt = 1: When qt = 1; the entrepreneur
is indifferent on the scale of the project, so is is indeterminate within [0;it]: The difference
between qR
t and qt is a wedge between the cost of purchasing outside equity and the cost of
generating inside equity. The physical capital run by the entrepreneur evolves according to
kt+1 = kt + it
so using the deﬁnition of equity (2):











Resellability Constraints. In addition to the borrowing constraint imposed by moral hazard,
there is a constraint on the sales of equity created in previous periods. Resellability con-
straints impose a limit on sales of equity that may be sold at every period. These constraints





t+1  tnt (8)
Kiyotaki and Moore motivate these constraints by adverse selection in the equity market.
Bigio [2009] and Kurlat [2009] show that such a constraint will follow from adverse selection
stemming from private information on the quality of assets. There are multiple alternative
explanations on why liquidity may vary over the business cycle. We discuss some alterna-
tive explanations in the concluding section. Here, what matters is that liquidity shocks, t;
prevent equity markets from materializing gains from trade.
Plugging in the resellability constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint into (7),
an overall constraint is obtained:
nt+1  (1   t)nt + (1   )it (9)
Along the paper, this constraint will be referred to as a liquidity constraint. The constraint
reads that equity holdings next period nt+1 are greater than or equal to the least amount of
previously held equity the entrepreneur must keep for itself; (1   t)nt; plus the minimal
amount of ownership over the new investment project such that the project is incentive
compatible.
When qt > 1; the cost of increasing equity by purchasing outside equity is larger than
putting the same amount as down-payment and co-ﬁnancing the rest (qt > qR). Moreover,
when qt > 1; by selling equity and using the amount as down-payment, the agent increases




 1 > 1: Since when qt > 1; investing entrepreneurs must set e
+
t+1 = 0
and (9) binds. Using these facts, the investing entrepreneur’s budget constraint (1)may be
rewritten in a convenient way by substituting (7) and id
t = it   qtis












t = qtt + qR (1   t): When qt = 1; this constraint is identical to the saving en-
trepreneur’s budget constraint when the evolution of its equity is replaced into (1). Thus
9without loss of generality, the entrepreneur’s problem simpliﬁes to:
Problem 3 (saver’s problem).
V
s
t (wt) = max
ct;nt+1







subject to the following budget constraint:
ct + qtnt+1 = (rt + qt+1)nt  w
s
t
Vt+1 represents the entrepreneur’s future value. Vt+1 does not include a type superscript
since types are random and the expectation term is also over the type space also. wt+1 is the
entrepreneur’s virtual wealth which also depends on the type. The investing entrepreneur
solves the following problem:
Problem 4 (investor’s problem).
V
i
t (wt) = max
it;ct;nt+1



















Finally, workers provide labor lt to production in exchange for consumption goods ct in
order to maximize their static utility.
















and subject to the following budget constraint:
c = !tl
Along the discussion we have indirectly shown the following Lemma:





: In addition, when Tobin’s q is q > 1, the liquidity
constraint (9) binds for all investing entrepreneurs. When q = 1; policies for saving and investing
entrepreneurs are identical and aggregate investment is obtained by market clearing in the equity
market.
qt is never below 1 since capital is reversible. Models with adjustment costs would not
have this property.9 The following assumption is imposed so that liquidity plays some role
in the model:
9In Sargent [1980], investment is irreversible so q may be below one in equilibrium. This happens when, at
q=1, the demand for consumption goods generates negative investment. q must adjust to below one such that
the demand for investment is 0.
10Figure 1: Liquidity constraints The left panel shows how borrowing constraints impose a
cap on the amount of equity that can be sold to ﬁnance a down payment. The middle panel
shows how liquidity shocks affect the amount of resources available as a down payment.
The right panel shows the price effect of the shock which may or may not reinforce the
liquidity shock.
Assumption 2.  < 1   
If this condition is not met, then the economy does not require liquidity at all in order
to exploit investment opportunities efﬁciently. Before proceeding to the calibration of the
model we provide two digressions: one about the intuition behind the ampliﬁcation mech-
anism behind liquidity shocks and the other about a broader interpretation of the ﬁnancial
contracts in the model.
2.5 Intuition behind the effects
A brief digression on the role of t is useful before studying the equilibrium in more detail.
Whenever qt > 1, external ﬁnancing allows investing entrepreneurs to arbitrage. In such
nu, the entrepreneur wants to ﬁnance investment projects as much as possible. We have
already shown that when constraints are binding, the entrepreneur owns the fraction (1 )
of investment while he ﬁnances only (1   qt). If he uses less external ﬁnancing he misses
the opportunity to obtain more equity.
To gain intuition, let’s abstract form the consumption decision and assume that the en-
trepreneur uses xt  qttnt to ﬁnance the down-payment. Thus, id
t = xt. The constraints
impose a restriction on the amount external equity that may be issued, is
t  it. External
ﬁnancing is obtained by selling is




t. Since it = i
f
t + id





t + xt): (10)
Figures 1 describes the simple intuition behind the liquidity channel. The ﬁgure explains
how changes in the amount xt of sales of equity corresponding to older projects affects in-
11vestment by restricting the amount of external ﬁnancing for new projects. Panel (a) in Figure
1 plots the right and left hand sides of restriction on outside funding given by the inequality
(10). Outside funding, i
f
t , is restricted to lie in the area where the afﬁne function is above
the 45-degree line. Since qt > 1; the left panel shows that the liquidity constraint imposes
a cap on the capacity to raise funds to ﬁnance the project. Panel (b) shows the effects of a
decreases in xt without considering any price effects. The fall in the down-payment reduces
the intercept of the function deﬁned by the right hand side of Figure 1. External funding,
therefore, falls together with the whole scale of the project. Since investment falls, the price
of q must rise such that the demand for saving instruments fall to match the fall in supply.
The increase in the price of equity implies that the amount ﬁnanced externally is higher.
The effect on the price increases the slope and intercept which partially counterbalances the
original effect. This effect is captured in the panel to the right of Figure 1.
2.6 Alternative Financial Contracts
There is a sense in which the operation of selling equity to ﬁnance the down-payment for
new projects resembles Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). In particular, selling equity
is equivalent to signing a state contingent debt contract in which equity is used as collateral.
In this case, if the principal of the debt contract is the future value of equity, and the inter-
est is equal to the return of capital, then selling equity or issuing state continent debt are
equivalent for both parties. Thus, the ﬁnancial contracts in the paper may be thought of as
a primitive form of CDO with a very simple structure: the return is contingent on the assets
return and there is a single trench. Moreover, there is no additional default risk because
assets can be liquidated immediately. In reality, ﬁnancial contracts based on CDOs are more
complicated as they involve bundling assets and decomposing them into assets of different
risk.
In terms of the model, selling equity (or securitizing) is more convenient for the invest-
ing entrepreneur than using the same amount of equity as collateral for the project. To
see why, observe that the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint for a contract




t) + tnt: By incrementing a unit of collateral, the increment in ex-
ternal ﬁnancing is 1
1 qt. Therefore, the marginal value of one extra unit of collateral is
qt 1
1 qt:






1 qt since qt < 1 in equilibrium. One can also
show that amount of equity supplied by investing entrepreneurs under these contracts is
less than the amount if equity is sold even if the amount of external ﬁnancing for this project
is substantially larger. Thus, using equity as collateral instead of selling it leads to more in-
efﬁciencies. The intuition behind this is that investing entrepreneurs value equity less than
saving entrepreneurs. At the point in which investing entrepreneur sell equity, they obtain
the value of equity in terms of consumption units, which they convert once more, into eq-
uity by ﬁnancing a larger portion of the project and raising external funds. This quantity is
larger than the original amount of equity that would be used as collateral. Hence, by selling
equity, the entrepreneur relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint further more.
Finally, themodelabstractsfromdebtcontractswithaﬁxedcoupon. Withaﬁxedcoupon,
12andusingequityascollateral, thereturnforasavingentrepreneurwouldbemin(R;(rt + ))
for every unit of consumption loaned backed by a unit of equity. The model could be
adapted by introducing this additional asset. The demand for this asset would be given by R
and the solution to a portfolio problem and the supply given by the investing entrepreneurs
willingness to obtain these loans.
3 Equilibrium
The right hand side of the entrepreneurs’ budget constraints deﬁnes their corresponding
wealth: ws
t = (rt + qt)nt and wi
t = (rt + qi
t)nt: A stationary recursive equilibrium is de-
ﬁned by considering the distribution of this wealth vector.
Deﬁnition 1 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A recursive competitive equilib-
rium is a set price functions, q;!;r : S ! R+ allocation functions, n0;j;cj;lj;ij : S ! R+ for
j = i;s;w, a sequence of distributions t of equity holdings; and a transition function, ; for the
aggregate nu such that:
1. Optimality of Policies: Given, q and !; cj;nj;0;ij;0;ij;0; j = i;s;w; solve the problems 3, 4 and
5.
2. Goods market clear at price 1.
3. Labor markets clear at price w.
4. Equity market clear at price q.
5. Firms are run efﬁciently and per unit of capital proﬁts are equal to r:
6. Aggregate capital evolves according to K0(s) = I (s) + K (s).
7. t and  are consistent with the policy functions obtained from problems 3, 4 and 5.
The equilibrium concept deﬁned above is recursive for the aggregate state variables.
What we mean by this is that the sequence of wealth distributions, t, is a relevant state
variable determine individual quantities but not aggregate quantities.
Optimal Policies: Note that the problem for both entrepreneurs is similar. Both types
choose consumption and equity holdings for next period but differ in the effective cost of
equity that each of them faces. The following propositions describe the policy functions and
show that these are linear functions of the wealth vector.
Proposition 1 (Savers policies). Policy functions for saving entrepreneurs are given by:
c
s












The corresponding policies for investing entrepreneurs are,
13Proposition 2 (investors policies). Policy functions for investing entrepreneurs satisfy:





















nt+1 + (t   1)nt
(1   )
and
(ii) For all st such that qt = 1; policies are identical to the saving entrepreneurs and it is indeter-
minate at the individual level.
The marginal propensities to save of the previous proposition will depend only on the






























The following proposition characterizes these marginal propensities.
Proposition 3 (Recursion). The functions &i
t and &s













































































































) = (1;1) then &s
t = &i
t = :10
A proof for the three previous propositions is provided in the appendix. Because policy
functions are linear functions of wealth, the economy admits aggregation (this is the well
known Gorman aggregation result). The appendix also shows that the economy in KM, is
identical to the one here, when the money supply in that paper is set to 0.
Labor Demand: Taking the physical capital kt as given, ﬁrms are run efﬁciently. Using the
ﬁrst order conditions aggregate labor demand is obtained by integrating over the individual
capital stock.
10We show in the appendix that (12) and (13) conform a contraction for preference parameters such that
1   
=   1 and returns satisfying Et

Rij
, j 2 fi;sg  1. On the other hand, as long as the entrepreneurs
problem is deﬁned uniquely, equilibria can be computed by checking that the iterations on (12) and (13). Upon










Equilibrium Employment: Workers consume their labor income so ct = !tLs
t (At;Kt): The
solution to the workers problem deﬁnes a labor supply schedule. Solving for equilibrium
employment pins down the average wage, !t =  !



















Returns to Equity: The return to capital owned by an entrepreneur is a function At and !t.
















+ < 0:  governs the elasticity of aggre-
gate returns as a function of aggregate capital. The closer  is to 1, proﬁts are more elastic to
aggregate capital and the return is lower.
3.1 Characterization
The dynamics of the model are obtained by aggregating over the individual states using the
policy functions described in the previous section.
Aggregate Output: Total output is the sum of the return to labor and the return to capital.
The labor share of income is,
wtL
s
t =  !






The return to equity is (16). By integrating with respect to idiosyncratic capital endowment
we obtain the capital share of income:




















Since, 0 <  + 1 < 1; this ensures that this economy has decreasing returns to scale at the
aggregate level. This ensures that K is bounded. By, consistency Kt =
R
nt(w)dw: Since
investment opportunities are i.i.d, the fraction of equity owned by investing and saving
entrepreneurs are Kt and (1   )Kt respectively. The aggregate consumption, Cs
t; and
equity holdings, Ns
t+1; of saving entrepreneurs are:
15C
s
t = (1   &
s





t (rt + qt)(1   )Kt:




























The evolution of marginal propensities to save and portfolio weights are given by the so-
lution to the ﬁxed point problem in Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the end of the period
fraction of aggregate investment owned by investing entrepreneurs Ii
t (st) must satisfy the










  (1   t)

Kt: (18)
(1   t)Kt is the lowest possible amount of equity that remains in hands of investing





t is the equilibrium aggre-
gate amount of equity holdings. The difference between these two quantities is the highest
possible amount of equity they may hold, which corresponds to new investment projects.






t (rt + qt)(1   )
qt
  t   (1   )

Kt (19)
In equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraints (5) that hold at the individual level









The above condition is characterized by a quadratic equation as a function of qt. The follow-
ing proposition is used to characterize market clearing in the equity market.
Proposition 4 (Market Clearing). For (;
) sufﬁciently close to (1;1); there exists a unique qt





1 if 1 > x2 > x1
x2 if x2 > 1 > x1
1 if otherwise
where the terms x2 and x1 are continuous functions of (t;&i
t;&s
t;rt) and the parameters.
The explicit solution for (x2;x1) is provided in the appendix. The solution accounts for
the incentive constraint. When q > 1; the constraints are binding for all entrepreneurs.
16When, q = 1; investment at the individual level is not determined. At the aggregate level,
without loss of generality, one can set the constraints above at equality when qt = 1. By
adding Ii
t (st) and Is
t (st); one obtains aggregate investment. Because, q is continuous in &s
and &i; the following is also true,
Proposition 5. &s
t;&i
t;It; and qt are continuous functions of the aggregate state (st):
The proof follows from the continuity of qt given by Proposition 4. &s
t and &i
t are, in turn,
also continuous when qt is smooth. Continuous policy functions guarantee that It is also
continuous. We use the continuity of the recursive equilibrium to establish a closed form for
the liquidity frontier that separates the state-space into regions where constraints are and
aren’t binding.
3.2 The Liquidity Frontier
Substituting (18) and (19) into (20) at equality for qt = 1; we obtain the minimum level of
liquidity required such that constraints are not binding. Formally, we have:
Proposition 6 (Liquidity Frontier). 9!;  : A  K ! R deﬁned by:

 (A;K) =




t (r(A;K) + )   ]
liquidity constraints (9) bind iff t < :
Here, r(A;K) is deﬁned by equation (16). The proposition states that for any (K;A)
selection of the state-space, S, there is a threshold value  such that if liquidity shocks
fall below that value, the liquidity constraints bind. We call the function  the liquidity
frontier, as it separates the state space into two regions. Sn is the set of points where the
liquidity constraint binds so  = @Sn. The interpretation of the liquidity frontier is simple.
[&s
t (r(A;K) + )   ] is the amount of entrepreneurs want to hold at q = 1. Since both types
are identical when q = 1, then &s
t characterizes the demand for equity by both groups. By
propositions 1 and 2, we know that &s
t (r(A;K) + ) is the demand for equity stock per unit
of wealth and  the remaining stock of equity per unit of wealth. The difference between
these quantities is the per-unit-of-capital demand for investment.
[(1   )(1   )   ] is the degree of enforcement constraint in this economy. As either
the fraction of savers, (1   ); or the private beneﬁt of diverting resources, (1   ); increase,
the economy requires more liquid assets to ﬁnance a larger amount of down-payment in
order to carry out investment efﬁciently.  is maximal supply of equity. Therefore, the
liquidity frontier is the degree of liquidity that allows the largest supply of assets to equal the
demand for investment project times the degree of enforcement exactly at the point where
q = 1. There are several lessons obtained from this analysis.
Lessons: Proposition 6 shows that liquidity shocks have stronger effects as the return to
capital r(A;K) is larger. This function, is increasing in productivity, A; and decreasing in the
capital stock, K (decreasing returns to scale). This is intuitive as the demand for investment
is greater when returns are high.
17The proposition is also important because it gives us a good idea of the magnitude that
liquidity shocks must have in order to cause a disruption on efﬁcient investment. Since
&s
t  1; (because it is a marginal propensity to save wealth at a high frequency), then
[&s
t (r(A;K) + )   ]  r(A;K): In addition, if   1; then,










By assumption,  2 (0;(1   )): This implies that  ! 0;  (A;K) will be close to
(1 )
 ;
that the economy requires a very large amount of liquidity to run efﬁciently. On the other
hand, as  ! (1   ), then  (A;K) will be close to zero implying that the economy does
not require liquidity at all. Moreover, we can show that for two values of  there is almost-
observational equivalence result.
Proposition 7 (Observational Equivalence). Let % be a recursive competitive equilibrium deﬁned
for parameters x  (;;): Then there exists another recursive competitive equilibrium %0 for
parameters x0  (0;0;0) which determines the same stochastic process for prices and allocations
as in % iff:










t 2 % when q > 1 and  (A;K;0) 2 [0;1] for q = 1. If (21) holds then, the new
triplet of parameters 0;0 is constructed in the following way: for every  2 ;   (A;K;),
assign to 0 any value 0 2 ( (A;K;0);1). For every  <  (A;K;); assign the value given by
(21): This procedure deﬁnes a map from  to 0. Finally, 0 should be consistent with :
We provide a sketch of the proof here. Condition (21) is obtained by substituting (18) and
(19)into(20)atequality. Thelefthandsideoftheconditionisthesolutiontoa0 suchthatfor
0; (20) also holds at equality. If this is the case, then the same q and investment allocations
clear out the equity market. Therefore, if the condition required by the proposition holds, 0
as constructed, will yield the same allocations and prices as the original equilibrium. Since
prices are the same, transition functions will be the same and so will the policy functions. If
the  (A;K;x0) 62 [0;1] then liquidity under the new parameters is insufﬁcient. This shows
the if part.
By contradiction, assume that the two equilibria are observationally equivalent. If (21) is
violated for some s 2 S, then, it is impossible to ﬁnd a liquidity shock between 0 and 1, such
that (20) is solved at equality. For these states, qt > 1 in the original equilibrium, but qt = 1
in the equilibrium with the alternative parameters.
A ﬁnal by-product of Proposition 6 is its use to compute an estimate of the amount of
outside liquidity needed to run the economy efﬁciently. In order to guarantee efﬁcient in-
vestment, an outside source of liquidity must be provided by fraction (   t) of total
capital stock every period. In this case,  should be evaluated at qt = 1 at all st: (   t) is a
random variable. The stationary distribution of the state-space then can be used to compute
the expected liquidity deﬁcit for this economy. Several policy exercises can be computed
using this analysis. For example, one can compute the amount of government subsidy re-
quired to run the economy efﬁciently.























Figure 2: Liquidity Frontier. Numerical Examples.
Figure 2, plots the liquidity frontier as a function of returns r(A;K); for three differ-
ent values of : Simulations show that the marginal propensities to save for values of  =
f0:9;0:7;0:5g are close to  = f0:99;975;0:945g respectively. The frontier is increasing in
the returns showing that weaker shocks will activate the constraints for higher returns. As




The nature of the calibration exercise is to make liquidity shocks have the largest effect possi-
ble in terms of output. Thus, we pick parameters within reasonable bounds for this purpose.
The model period is a quarter. The calibration of technology parameters is standard to
19business cycle theory. Following the standard in the RBC literature, technology shocks are
modeled such that their natural logarithm follows an AR(1) process. The persistence of the
process, A; is set to 0:95 and the standard deviation of the innovations of this process, A; is
set to 0:016. The weight of capital in production  is set to 0:3611. The depreciation of capital
is set to  = 0:974 so that annual depreciation is 10%.12
The probability of investment opportunities, , is set to 0:1 so that it matches the plant
level evidence of Cooper et al. [1999]. That data suggests that around 40% to 20% plants
augment a considerable part of their physical capital stock. These ﬁgures vary according to
a given plant’s age. By setting  to 0:1, the arrival of investment opportunities is such that
close to 30% of ﬁrms invest by the end of a year.
There is less consensus about parameters governing preferences. The key parameters
for determining the allocation between consumption and investment are the time discount
factor, ; and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, . The discount factor, ; is set to
0:9762 based on a complete markets benchmark, as in Campanale et al. [2010]. For our base
scenario, we set  and 
 to 1 to recover a log-preference structure. We check the robustness of
the results by changing these values in an alternative calibration. Nevertheless, the marginal
propensities to save &i and &s are roughly constant over the state-space. Picking a particular
combination of these parameters is similar to modifying  an keeping the log-preference
structure.13 Campanaleetal.[2010]argueinfavorofalowvaluefor basedonexperimental
evidence. Angeletos [2007] argues that empirical work based on asset pricing biases the
estimate downwards and sets the parameter to 1. For an alternative calibration, we set
this parameter to 0:9. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution  affects the stationary
distribution of the capital stock. Under, lower values of this parameter, the capital stock
ﬂuctuates around levels for which the return to capital is above 25% which seems large. The
size of investment over the capital stock is also unreasonably large. In Campanale et al.
[2010] this undesirable feature of a low value for  in our model is corrected by changing
the adjustment costs of investment. Adjustment costs are meant to capture some features of
lumpy-investment observed in micro-level data. Since random investment opportunities are
already capturing that feature, we do not innu such costs. For the alternative scenario, we
follow the estimates of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [2002] suggesting a risk aversion
parameter of around 10 for entrepreneurs.
The Frisch-elasticity is determined by the inverse of the parameter , which is set to 2.
This parameter also shifts the curvature of the aggregate production function as a function
of the aggregate capital stock. In other words,  and  are crucial to determine the volatility
of the returns to capital as the capital stock ﬂuctuates around the stationary distribution.
Volatility is a second order effect: in equilibrium, the distribution of capital will accommo-
date so that the average return to capital is consistent with the agent’s marginal propensities
to save (equations (24) and (25)).  ! is a normalization constant that plays no role in the
11Acemoglu and Guerrieri [2008] have shown that the capital share of aggregate output has been roughly
constant over the last 60 years.
12It is common to ﬁnd calibrations where annual depreciation is 5%. This parameter is crucial in determining
the magnitude of the response of output to liquidity shocks. In particular, this response is greater the larger
the depreciation rate. We discuss this aspect later on.
13Nevertheless, asset prices change drastically when these parameters are modiﬁed.
20model.
Two sets of parameters remain to be calibrated: ; the parameter that governs the limited
enforcement problem in investment and the parameters related to the liquidity shocks: 
and . The limited enforcement parameter satisﬁes 0   < 1    = 0:9: Thus, there
is very large degree of freedom to calibrate . Moreover, there is almost an observational
equivalence as shown in Proposition 7. Therefore, for comparison reasons only, we set  =
0:15; as this is the value chosen by del Negro et al. [2010]. The lower and upper bounds of 
are calibrated by setting (L;H) = (0:0;0:3). This choice renders an unconditional mean of
liquidity of 0.15 as in del Negro et al. [2010].
The meaning of  should not be taken too literally. There are many ways to introduce
ﬁnancial frictions, the simplest of which is the limited enforcement problem presented here.
In our view,  should be understood as a parameter that captures the idea that external
ﬁnancing requires a down-payment to curtail incentives. Neither should 1
 be understood as
a leverage ratio for the economy. The ﬁnancial contracts described in the model as such that
equity is sold to ﬁnance the down-payment. In reality, equity is sold and used as collateral.
As described before, this distinction is irrelevant for the model but implies very different
leverage ratios.
In the alternative calibration, we choose  using as a target a mean risk-free rate of
roughly 1% and volatility of 1:7% which are roughly the values for the U.S. economy.14 We
argued previously that  and  determine the liquidity frontier.  and  determine how
often and how deeply will liquidity shocks enter the liquidity constrained region. Lower
values  and  (on average) cause q to become increase. These parameters interplay to de-
termine the volatility of the price of equity and the stochastic discount factor since they
inﬂuence the effect on consumption after the entrepreneur switches from one type to an-
other (equations (24) and (25)). Based on this consideration, we set (L;H) = (0:17;0:25) in
the alternative scenario.
Finally, we describe the calibration strategy for the transition matrix . There are three
desirable features that the transition probability  should have: (1) That it induces (At;t)
to be correlated. Bigio [2009] and Kurlat [2009] study the relation between liquidity and
aggregate productivity when liquidity is determined by the solution to a problem of asym-
metric information. Both papers provide theoretical results in which the relation between
productivity and liquidity is positive. (2) That At and t are independent of t 1. In princi-
ple, at least in quarterly frequency, liquidity should not explain aggregate productivity. We
relax this assumption in the appendix where we discuss the effects of rare and persistent
liquidity crises. (3) At has positive time correlation, as in the RBC-literature. We calibrate
the transition to obtain these properties. In the computer A is discrete. We let A be the dis-
crete approximation to an AR(1) process with typical element a0;a = PrfAt+1 = a0jAt = ag.
To construct the joint process for At and t we ﬁrst construct a monotone map from  to A
and denote it by A(): This map is simply the order of elements in . Let u be a uniform
transition matrix and let @ 2 [0;1]. We ﬁll in  by letting its typical element (a0;0)(a;) be
deﬁned in the following way:
14We discuss the asset pricing properties of the model in the appendix
21Calibration Preferences Technology Aggregate Shocks
 
   !     A A A @ L H
Baseline 0.976 1 1 2 0.9 0.36 0.974 0.1 0.15 0.95 0 0.016 0.95 0 0.3
Alternative 0.976 0.9 10 2 0.9 0.36 0.974 0.1 0.15 0.95 0 0.016 0.95 0.17 0.25
Table 1: Calibration
(a0;0)(a;)  PrfAt+1 = a
0;t+1 = 
0jAt = a;t = g
= a0;a 
 
@  A(0);a + (1   @)  u

Approximated in this way,  has all of the 3 properties we desire. The parametrization @
governs the correlation between At and t: By construction (A;) are independent of ; but
A follows an AR(1) process. Under this assumption, the model requires 5 parameters to
calibrate : (A;A) the standard parameters of the AR(1) process for technology, (L;H)
the lower and upper bounds of  and @ the degree of correlation between liquidity shocks
and technology shocks.
When we study the asset pricing properties of the model, we ﬁnd that the standard devi-
ation of the risk-free rate approximates better the values found in the data when @ is close to
1. It is worth noting that when liquidity shocks are endogenous, as in Bigio [2009] or Kurlat
[2009], a high autocorrelation, @ and (L;H) are delivered as outcomes of the model. The
equity premium is higher for a higher values of the correlation. For these reasons we set
@ = 0:95: The same risk free rate may be obtained by different combinations of  and a new
parameter @ (which we discuss below) but at the expense of affecting its own volatility and
the mean of the equity premium.
Alternative Calibration Strategy: An alternative calibration strategy could have followed
from the work of Chari et al. [2007]. These authors estimate an investment wedge for the
U.S. economy, by reverse-engineering a wedge in a standard euler equation. The model pre-
sented here, delivers a similar wedge for each entrepreneur type. Since the model has two
representative entrepreneurs (as well as hand-to-mouth workers), a direct mapping cannot
be constructed from the wedges here to the wedges in that paper. An alternative calibra-
tion strategy may reverse-engineer the wedges in our paper, and then calibrate the liquidity
shocks to deliver similar wedges as found in the data. We leave this task for a more detailed
model.
4.2 Qualitative Results
In this section, we describe the main qualitative ﬁndings of the model obtained by comput-
ing the recursive competitive equilibria.15 These equilibria are computed using a grid size
15Fortran c 
 and Matlab c 
 codes are available upon request. The codes run in approximately 25 minutes and
2 hours respectively. For log-preferences, the computation time is reduced more than 100 times.
22of 6 for A and . The grid size for the capital stock is 120. No important changes in the mo-
ments of the data generated by the model are obtained by increasing the grid size. Figure 3
plots q; qi and qR over the state-space. Each panel corresponds to a combination of an aggre-
gate productivity shock and a liquidity shock. The aggregate capital state is plotted in the
x-axis of each panel. Some plots show a threshold capital level for which q is above one and
equal to 1 for capital above that level. Those points of the state-space coincide with points
where the liquidity frontier is crossed. The ﬁgure helps explain how there are two forces
in determining q in the model. By comparing the panels in the left from those in the right,
we observe how q is lower in states where liquidity is higher. This happens because more
liquidity relaxes the enforcement constraint at the aggregate level. To clear out the equity
market when liquidity is tighter, q must increase to deter saving entrepreneurs from invest-
ing in projects that don’t satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. On the other hand,
by comparing the upper row with the one on the bottom, we observe the effects of higher ag-
gregate productivity. q increases when productivity is higher. This happens because agents
demand more investment at these states since returns are predicted to be higher in the fu-
ture. Inside the area below the liquidity frontier, the enforcement constraint is binding at
an aggregate level. In these states, q must increase to make investing entrepreneurs invest
more, and deter saving entrepreneurs from ﬁnancing projects externally.
The corresponding plots for aggregate investment are depicted in Figure 4. Each panel
plots 5 curves. These curves are the aggregate investment, investment in new projects
owned by saving and investing entrepreneurs (the aggregate levels of is and ii) and the
net change in the equity position of both groups. The plots show that investment is close
to being a linear function of capital, but this relation changes when the liquidity frontier is
crossed. Why? Notice that there is a kink in aggregate investment when q rises above 1,
which corresponds to points inside the liquidity frontier. Outside the liquidity constrained
region, the lower the capital stock, the larger the demand to replenish the capital stock (re-
turns to equity are higher). Inside the liquidity constrained region, the lower the capital
stock, the lower the amount of liquid assets for the same liquidity shock. Because liquidity
is lower, investing entrepreneurs have a smaller amount to use as down-payment: invest-
ment must be lower. This effect is explained in Section 2.5. In addition, there is an important
wealth transfer from investing to saving entrepreneurs in the liquidity constrained region.
Thus, the overall effect on investment is also inﬂuenced by a wealth effect.
The plots show that investment is greater as aggregate productivity increases but falls
when there is less liquidity. Inside each plot, we observe that the fraction of investment
owned by investing entrepreneurs is always around (1   ) which is 85% in our base cal-
ibration. The net increase in equity is much less though. Inside the model, investing en-
trepreneurs are ﬁnancing new projects by selling older ones. This implies that they are sell-
ing a signiﬁcant fraction of their old equity stock. Outside the liquidity constrained region,
the increase in equity for both groups is exactly proportional to their relative populations.
Below the liquidity frontier, the increase in equity by investing entrepreneurs increases be-
cause investing entrepreneurs sell older projects at a price q and their cost of generating
equity is
 
qR 1 : Arbitrage opportunities translate into a wealth transfer from savers to in-
vesting entrepreneurs. Clearly, inside the liquidity constrained region, the volume of trade
23in old projects falls as liquidity shocks approach to the liquidity frontier.
Marginalpropensitiestosaveareconstantandequalto forlog-utility. When < 1;they
satisfy the following characteristics: (1) in the constrained region, investing entrepreneurs
have a lower marginal propensity to save which is by a strong governed by a wealth effect;
(2) the marginal propensity to save of saving entrepreneurs is decreasing in q and the con-
verse is true about investing entrepreneurs. These relations are reverted when  > 1: Nev-
ertheless, simulations shows that for different choices of ; marginal propensities to save are
not constant but don’t move very much.
As in He and Krishnamurthy [2008] and Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2009], this model
also highlights the importance of global methods in understanding the interaction between
liquidity shocks and the constraints. Is linearizing the model a bad idea? Yes and no. No
because, the behavior of inside either region seems to be very linear for our choice of param-
eters. This, in fact, is not true for other parameters. On the other hand, linearization may
become problematic. The reason is that it may be highly likely that the liquidity frontier is
crossed often because in stochastic environments, the capital stock is often above the desired
level of capital. These states necessarily lie in the unconstrained region. Bigio [2009] shows
that if illiquidty is caused by asymmetric information, liquidity shocks will fall close to the
liquidity frontier. Moreover, in the appendix, we argue that in order to replicate a reasonable
risk-free rate, liquidity shocks must fall close to the liquidity frontier. Because it’s given in an
analytical form (at least for log-preferences), the liquidity frontier may be used to asses how
close the deterministic steady-states of an approximated model is to the liquidity frontier.
Figure 7 depicts the marginal uncondition distribution of the capital stock as well as the
marginal distribution of conditional on constraints being binding. The next section describes
the main quantitative properties of the model.
4.3 Moments
Statistics: Table 2 reports the standard RBC moments delivered by the model. The table is
broken into the moments corresponding to the unconditional distribution and conditioned
on the event that the economy is in the liquidity constrained region. Whenever they appear,
the numbers in parenthesis correspond to the standard deviation corresponding to the av-
erage above them. All of the results are computed with respect to the model’s stationary
distribution of the aggregate state. The bottom row of the table reports the computed oc-
cupation time within the region below the liquidity frontier Sb (the region where liquidity
constraints bind). For the baseline calibration, the occupation time within the liquidity con-
strained region is roughly 87%. The ﬁrst row presents the average value of q, which is close
to 1.5, meaning that the wedge between the cost of capital and the transformation rate is
about 50%. In the constrained region, the wedge is on average 16% larger than its uncondi-
tional mean and 58% larger than in the unconstrained region. On the other hand, q is not
very volatile. The standard deviation is about 0.5%. The second row reports the average
unconditional investment/output ratio which is around 20%. This rate is slightly smaller
in the constrained region because investment is inefﬁciently low in the constrained region.
The average within the unconstrained region is considerably larger and equal to 30%. The
24unconditional volatility of investment over the volatility of output is almost 4 times larger.
This relative volatility is much lower within the unconstrained region. This ﬁgure is not sur-
prising once one considers that workers are not smoothing consumption (on their own will).
The fourth and ﬁfth rows describe the average marginal propensities to consume of both en-
trepreneurs.16 The seventh column reports the relative size of output within each region.
Output is on average 2.5% lower within the constrained region and 15% larger outside this
region. Two things explain this large differences: (1) lower output is associated with a lower
capital stock, which in turn, increases returns and the probability of binding constraints. (2)
low liquidity is associated with low aggregate productivity shock. Similarly, worked hours
are considerably larger within the unconstrained region.
The unconditional correlation between q and investment is negative and close to -95%.
This happens because, most of the time, the economy is in the liquidity constrained region
and the relation between these two variables is negative in this region (but theoretically
undeterminate). The fact that ﬁnancing constraints can break the relation between q and
investment is also found in prior work by Lorenzoni and Walentin [2009]. In our model,
the relation between q and investment breaks is explained by Figure 4. The reason is that
these correlations are driven by two forces that work in opposite directions: ceteris paribus
liquidity shocks reduce these correlations and aggregate productivity shocks increase them.
When liquidity shocks hit, the economy is more constrained, so q must rise to clear the
market for new equity. This occurs together with a fall in investment. On the other hand,
positive productivity shocks drive q as larger returns to equity are expected. q grows to
clear out the equity market while investment is larger. The correlation computed under the
baseline calibration is considerably lower than in the data. This suggests that the liquidity
shockscalibrated hereare extremelylarge, afeature thatwe openlyacknowledge aswe want
to get as much as we can from the shocks.
Another interesting feature of the model is that it generates right skewness in the station-
ary distribution of the capital stock compared to a frictionless economy. The reason is that
when the capital stock is lower, the liquidity constraints tend to be tighter. This feature is
reﬂected into less investment than otherwise, which, in turn makes the capital stock recover
at a slower pace. On the other hand, the average capital stock is lower in this economy than
in a frictionless economy. One way to see this is that under log-preferences, the marginal
propensities to save are constant, so all of the effect on investment is through a substitution
effect. In the case of saving entrepreneurs, this effect is negative and dominates the increase
on investment by investing entrepreneurs.
Results under the alternative calibration: Table 3 reports the model’s statistics for the alter-
native calibration. The calibration is such that the model delivers a reasonable risk-free rate,
afeaturethatisdiscussedintheappendix. Theimportantthingtonotehereisthatthemodel
requires liquidity shocks to be calibrated so that they fall in the region close to the liquid-
ity frontier in order to obtain reasonable risk-free rates. Under this alternative calibration,
the occupation time of liquidity constraints is 75% which is not very far from the occupa-
tion time in the baseline calibration. In contrast, the magnitude of liquidity shocks is much
lower. This reﬂects itself in the average conditional and unconditional values of q, which
16In the baseline scenario, these are constants and equal to .
25is much lower and implies a lower wedge. The share of investment over output remains
roughly at 20%. The volatility of investment over output falls considerably which reﬂects
the smaller distortions on investment. In addition, the differences in output and hours are
also considerably smaller. More interestingly, as opposed to the baseline scenario, average
output and hours are larger in the liquidity constrained region. The reason is that liquidity
constraints are driven much more with positive aggregate productivity (see discussion on
the liquidity frontier), than by strong liquidity shocks. This aspect of the alternative calibra-
tion is also reﬂected in a larger and positive correlation between q and investment. In this
scenario, the effects of technology shocks are more powerful than those corresponding to
liquidity shocks, so the force towards a positive correlation dominates.
The analysis shows that the average marginal propensities to save for both entrepreneurs
are close to each other. They vary in less than 3 decimal points along the whole state space
and the standard deviation has an order of magnitude less than 5 decimal points. This sug-
gests, asexplainedbefore, thatthelogutilityisnotabadapproximationifthediscountfactor
is adjusted accordingly.17 Finally, the computations show that the unconditional distribution
of capital is tighter, shifted to the right and less skewed.
Finally, the fact that asset prices and the relation between q and investment are closer to
reality in the alternative calibration suggests that the size of liquidity shocks in the model are
overstated. This reinforces the conclusions we obtain from the impulse response analysis:
without labor frictions, liquidity shocks will not have an important effect on output.
Impulse Responses: Figure 5 plots the impulse response of several key variables after a
drop in liquidity from the average level of 15% to 0%. The drop occurs only for one quar-
ter after which liquidity follows its stochastic process. The responses are computed setting
the economy at its unconditional average state. The dynamics implied by liquidity shocks
resemble investment shocks. The plots show that investment falls contemporaneously with
the drop in liquidity. The liquidity shock drives up q because there is less amount of liquid-
ity to meet the supply of sources of external ﬁnancing. An increase in q beneﬁts investing
entrepreneurs but at the aggregate level, induces as substitution effect towards consump-
tion. Because the capital in place is ﬁxed, output only responds 1 period after the shock
is realized. All of the subsequent effect on output is driven by the fall in the capital stock
which is caused by the fall in investment. Because output is constant during the period of
the shock, overall consumption increases. Hours and wages co-move with the capital stock
so both fall together in the periods after the liquidity shock is gone. The probability of bind-
ing constraints jumps in the period where the shock occurs, and remains slightly above the
unconditional average as the returns to capital are larger.18. After the liquidity shock is gone,
all of the variables in the model remain at lower levels as the capital stock slowly converges
to its stationary level.
The calibration is purposely constructed in such a way that the overall effect on output
is the largest possible. The peak drop on output is close to 0.7% of the unconditional mean
of output, suggesting that the effects of an extreme fall in liquidity are not very large. We
devote the next section to explain why. The dynamics under the alternative calibration are
17For example, for this scenario, one can choose a value of 0.971 for  and the results will be roughly similar.
18Recall that the liquidity frontier is higher when returns are larger
26Variable Moments
Unconditional Constrained Unconstrained
q 1.5 1.58 1
(0.499) (0.492) (0)
i/y 0.186 0.175 0.291
(i) / (y) 3.84 4.33 1.13
&i 0.976 0.976 0.976
(0) (0) (0)
&s 0.976 0.976 0.976
(0) (0) (0)
y/E[y] 1 0.977 1.15
hours/E[hours] 1 0.992 1.05
corr(q,i) -0.945 -0.941 0
Occupation Time 0.871 0.129
Table 2: Key statistics under baseline calibration.
very similar. On the other hand, the effects of liquidity shocks are non-linear: a fall in liq-
uidity from 15% to 10% delivers an overall effect 0.08% which is 10 times smaller than when
liquidity falls from 15% to 0%.
4.4 Discussion: Why are the effects so small?
Thereisanintuitiveexplanationforwhytheliquidityshockshaveaminorimpactonoutput.
For any reasonable calibration the ratio of investment to capital ratio will be small. Liquidity
shocks introduce a friction on investment (when it is positive). The strongest possible effect
of a liquidity shock is to prevent the economy from investing at all. Thus, at most, capital
can fall by 1   : Without considering labor effects, any disruption acting on investment
will drop output by no more than (1   )%: In our calibration, this number is about 1:0%.
In the model, the labor supply reacts positively to a fall in the capital stock so the effect
is partially mitigated. On the other hand, liquidity shocks will not drive investment to 0
because investing entrepreneurs can invest by using internal funds. Thus, the fall in 0.7% in
output should be expected.
Liquidity shocks also generate the wrong contemporaneous co-movement between out-
put and consumption. This happens because, in the model, liquidity shocks don’t affect any
of the factors of production contemporaneously. Since output remains unchanged in the pe-
riod of the shock, liquidity shocks distort allocations towards consumption. This result is
originally pointed out in Barro and King [1984].
To generate stronger effects, liquidity shocks must interact with a distortion on labor.
Models that introduce nominal rigidities are able to achieve a stronger ampliﬁcation be-
cause a small change in the capital stock has important effects on output. Nominal rigidities
prevent prices from adjusting so quantities fall. Although the original effect may be small, it
propagates further more because a fall in aggregate demand causes output to contract fur-
27Variable Moments
Unconditional Constrained Unconstrained
q 1.02 1.04 1
(0.0298) (0.0297) (0)
i/y 0.199 0.201 0.191
(i) / (y) 1.48 1.45 1.51
&i 0.971 0.971 0.971
(8.75e-005) (7.95e-005) (5.67e-005)
&s 0.971 0.971 0.971
(6.76e-005) (7.21e-005) (5.67e-005)
y/E[y] 1 1.01 0.982
hours/E[hours] 1 1 0.997
corr(q,i) 0.135 0.039 0
Occupation Time 0.649 0.351
Table 3: Key statistics under alternative calibration.
ther more as prices cannot adjust. In Justiniano et al. [2010], investment shocks are combined
with nominal rigidities so their effects are magniﬁed and generate the right co-movement
between output and consumption. For this same reason, liquidity shocks in del Negro et al.
[2010], have important effects on output.
Theﬁndingthatliquidityshockshaveamutedimpactisrelatedtopreviousresultsfound
by Kocherlakota [2000] and Cordoba and Ripoll [2004] but for different reasons. Kocher-
lakota [2000] and Cordoba and Ripoll [2004] focus on borrowing limits that depend on asset
values as an ampliﬁcation mechanism based on the model of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997].
Both papers agree that borrowing limits do not have much power as ampliﬁcation mech-
anisms of productivity or monetary shocks under standard preferences. According, to Liu
et al. [2010], the reason behind the muted response of output is that asset prices don’t react
much to the shock considered. The problem with collateral constraints is that even if one
ﬁnds a shocks that reacts strongly, the effects on output comes from a large reallocation of
a production input (capital or land) from the constrained sector to the unconstrained sector.
Unfortunately, this explanation is unsatisfactory because we don’t see large reallocations of
capital or land during recessions. If there is some factor being reallocated during a crises it is
more likely to be labor. Labor, off course, is rented, not bought, so it hardly has the feedback
effect from prices highlighted by Kiyotaki and Moore [1997].
In summary, liquidity shocks must be combined with other mechanisms that act by af-
fecting the labor input in order to have strong effects on output. The investment wedge
in this paper cannot be directly mapped into the investment wedge in Chari et al. [2007]
because the model presented here does not have a representative agent (it has two). Nev-
ertheless, the ﬁndings here are consistent with theirs in suggesting that a labor wedges are
more likely to be important in explaining the business cycle. The next section introduces
variable capital utilization. This will introduce a wedge in labor demand that is a function
of q. This provides an example of a mechanism that disrupts investment and labor decisions
28together.
5 Extension: Variable Capital Utilization
We now modify the problem to introduce variable capital utilization as in Greenwood et al.
[2000]. With variable capital utilization, q has a negative effect on employment, so liquidity
shocks also distort production. Again, we assume that the capital stock is ﬁxed at the begin-
ning of each period. The difference now is that in addition to choosing labor inputs, l, en-
trepreneurs also choose the fraction of the capital stock to be used in production, h 2 [0;1]. h
is referred to a the capital utilization. Production is carried out according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function that depends not on capital, but on the fraction of capital used in pro-
duction: F (hk;l)  (hk)
 l(1 ): The entrepreneur faces a trade-off for using a larger share
of the capital stock. By using more of its capital stock, capital depreciates at a faster rate.
Depreciation is modeled as a convex function of capital utilization  (h)  (1 ) 
(h=b)(1+d)
(1+d) ;
where d > 0 is a parameter governing the convexity of the function and b is a normalization
constant. The objective of the ﬁrm now takes into consideration the value of capital losses
q (h) induced by the utilization. Under decentralized production, by arbitrage, the rental
rate of capital must incorporate the loss in value of more utilization. Since we assume pro-
duction is carried out efﬁciently by entrepreneurs, the allocations must equal decentralized
















The derivation of the equilibrium conditions is similar as before. We jump straight to the
results as nothing substantial changes.19
Main implications: We set d to 2 which is close to the values chosen by Greenwood et al.
[2000]. b is chosen to normalize utilization to be equal to 1 at the peak of the business cy-
cle.  is calibrated in order to keep the annual average depreciation rate at 10%. The rest
of the parameters are kept constant. The average labor share of output is not affected (non-
surprisingly as capital utilization is close to 1), so there is no need to modify . We abstract
from analyzing the statistics and focus on the response of output reported in ﬁgure 6. The
most striking ﬁnding is the fall in output which is almost 10 times larger than for the bench-
mark model. The mechanics work in the following way: when liquidity is tighter, as before,
q increases. This increases the cost of capital utilization because the opportunity cost of de-
preciating capital is larger. Under the calibration, utilization falls in about 12% according to
the dashed curve in the bottom right panel of the ﬁgure. Since, capital utilization is a com-
plement of labor, the productivity of labor falls. Correspondingly, real wages and hours fall.
In particular, the fall in worked hours is close to 2.5% which is signiﬁcantly larger than the
0.3% found in the benchmark model. The reduction of two variable inputs of production,
utilization and hours, reduces output contemporaneously. The magnitude of these effects
19The detail of equilibrium conditions for all of the extensions to the model is available by the author upon
request.
29crucially depends on the parameter d, which measures the elasticity of the response of uti-
lization. Smaller values of these parameter increase the overall effect on output, but for a
close set of parameters, the size of the effect on output does not vary much.
On the other hand, the response of consumption is negligible, but shows the same pos-
itive jump at the time of the liquidity shock. A decomposition of consumption by agent
type, shows that it falls substantially for workers and investing entrepreneurs but, as before,
increases for saving entrepreneurs due to a strong substitution between consumption and
investment. At the aggregate level, the latter effect dominates. Following the period after
the shock vanishes, the capital stock is lower and the rest of the variables recover slowly
together lead by the evolution of the capital stock.
Alternative models with effects on labor: An alternative way in which liquidity shocks could
affect the labor demand may be introduced by requiring part of the wage bill to be payed
up-front. In such an environment, liquidity shocks affecting the working capital of the ﬁrm,
would introduce a wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and wages. In particu-
lar, such constraints would make labor inefﬁciently low. The implications of variable capital
utilization and working capital requirements are similar because in both environments, a
variable input is affected by liquidity shocks. The same could be said of any other variable
input such as intermediate goods for production.
Models with nominal rigidities have similar effects but for different reasons. After the
occurrence of a liquidity shock, the aggregate demand for produced goods falls. In a fric-
tionless this has now effects since prices adjust automatically. With nominal price rigidities
and differentiated goods, the change in the relative demand of consumption to investment
goods also shift demand away from the sector of ﬁrms stuck with lagged prices. This fall
in demand the relative demand is met with a reduction in current output. Under nominal
wage rigidities, this effect is further ampliﬁed. In comparison with del Negro et al. [2010],
the same dramatic liquidity shock produces a similar effect as the model with variable capi-
tal utilization.20
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a framework that extends analysis of the model formulated by Kiyotaki
and Moore [2008] into a fully stochastic environment. We show that two regimes coexist
under which the economy behaves as in the standard RBC economy and regimes where the
economy suffers liquidity shocks that have the effect of negative investment shocks. We
conclude the paper providing several suggestions for future research.
Alternative ampliﬁcation: Along the paper we stress that, in absence of frictions operating
on the labor market, liquidity shocks may not explain sizeable changes in output. To have
important effects on output, the model needs to be modiﬁed so that liquidity shocks also
affect labor or intermediate good input decisions. We introduced variable capital utilization
to highlight this point but perhaps the most natural way to do so is by imposing limited
enforcement of labor contracts or for the purchase of intermediate goods. This aspect would
20For the version of their model in which the Central Bank does not respond to the liquidity shock.
30generate a working capital requirement for ﬁrms. With less liquidity, the amount of working
capital is restricted and the allocation of labor inputs becomes inefﬁcient.
An alternative way of affecting inputs is as by introducing nominal rigidities. del Negro
et al. [2010] use Calvo pricing for this purpose. The drawback of this approach is that the
same friction that ampliﬁes liquidity shocks also induces a very large reduction in proﬁts
and labor income for not adjusting. In light of this, one wonders whether the same am-
pliﬁcation is obtained in a model with state-dependent rigidities. Microeconomic evidence
about pricing behavior during the crisis may be very useful to distinguish whether nominal
rigidities are an important friction when shocks are large.21
Micro-foundations for liquidity shocks: The next step towards a better theory of liquidity is
to explain what drives these shocks? We conceive three potential directions to explain large
ﬂuctuations in liquidity. First, adverse selection in the market for collateral may explain why
liquidity constraints may be suddenly tighter. In a standard real business cycle model with
idiosyncratic production risk, the distribution of these shocks don’t matter. If entrepreneurs
have private information on the quality of their capital, liquidity shocks may arise endoge-
nously as a problem of asymmetric information at the time they sell older projects. Eisfeldt
[2004]studiesaproblemwithasymmetricingeneralequilibriumtounderstandrisk-sharing.
More recently, Bigio [2009] and Kurlat [2009] have independently developed such a theory
based on asymmetric information on the quality of capital and equity respectively in the
context of KM.
A second line of research should study the relation between liquidity and noisy informa-
tion similar to some recent theories on demand shocks such as Angeletos and La’O [2009] or
Lorenzoni [2009]. For example, some assets may become illiquid if their are discrepancies in
their valuations caused by noisy information.
A third approach should relate liquidity with an explicit ﬁnancial system. He and Kr-
ishnamurthy [2008],Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2009],Gertler and Karadi [2009], Gertler
and Kiyotaki [2010], and Curdia and Woodford [2009] study aspect when ﬁnancial institu-
tions are also subject to limited enforcement constraints, so changes in the net-worth of the
ﬁnancial system have effects on their role as intermediaries. Bigio [2010] takes a different
approach. That paper stresses that the net-worth of the ﬁnancial system is key in determin-
ing the equilibrium in markets with asymmetric information. When the ﬁnancial system’s
position gets worse, it can bare less risk so pooling contracts are worse and liquidity drops.
Other assets: There also remains a technical challenge for introducing money or other
assets in this economy in a fully stochastic environment. A second asset in this environment
will feature a discontinuity in its excess demand at the liquidity frontier. This aspect may be
problematic to compute equilibria of the model. Perhaps this difﬁculty may be resolved by
introducing a second degree of heterogeneity but there is no immediate answer to do this.
Introducing other assets may be important for policy and positive analysis. This exten-
sion may be a useful to explain the effects of monetary policy and other unconventional
policies in different points of the cycle. For example, it would be useful to understand if
21Moreover, the policy implication are very different when inefﬁciencies in labor input choices are explained
by nominal rigidities instead of working capital requirements. The former suggests that policies targeted at
reducing nominal rigidities may be equally effective in reducing the effects of liquidity shocks.
31debt ﬁnancing of government deﬁcits may cause a crowding-out effect that worsens the lack
of liquidity.
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357 Proof of Optimal Policies (Propositions 1,2,3)
This section provides a proof of the optimal policies described in Section 3. The strategy
is guess and verify. For saving entrepreneurs, the guess is: V (w;t) = U (as






qt and for the investing entrepreneur, the guess is : V i (wi














7.1 Step 1: First Order Conditions
























































The last term follows from independence in investment opportunities. Observe also that

















t. Using these deﬁnitions ws
t is factored out

























































By replacing the guess for consumption and clearing out wealth, an Euler equation in terms






















































































































7.2 Step 2: Veriﬁcation of the Value function
ReplacingourguessandusingtheenvelopetheoremweobtainU
0 ((1   &s
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 and similarly, for the investing entrepreneur (ai
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1  ; j = i;s: The certainty equivalent of a
























































































































Note that any value function satisﬁes the envelope condition so any pair of functions (&s
t;&i
t)
satisfying this recursion guarantee that the functional form guessed for V i and V s satisfy the
Bellman equation. This operator appears in the statement of Proposition 3. Propositions 1
and 2 follow immediately. Finally, we show conditions under which 3 is a contraction.











< 1; where the expectation is with re-
spect to the future state s and the agents type: To simplify notation let x(s) = (1   &i (s))
 1
and y (s) = (1   &s)
 1 so that recursions (24) and (25) become:




























t are deﬁned in the previous step. These equations deﬁne an operator T :
S[1;1]2
! S[1;1]2
. That is, the operator maps continuous bounded functions from the state S
to [1;1] into itself: Since S is compact, then SR2
+ is a complete metric space with respect to
the sup-norm for the product space. Thus, T deﬁnes a recursion:
(xt+1;yt+1) = T (xt;yt)
37We check that the recursion satisﬁes Blackwell’s sufﬁcient conditions that guarantee that T
is a contraction.
Monotonicity. Whenever  < 1, the power function z
1
 1 is decreasing. Thus, for any x >




 1: Therefore, the certainty equivalent with respect to  for (x0;y0) is









































: If  > 1;
the argument is the same except that everything is monotone increasing. The analysis is
identical for 
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can be transformed into a form
of a certainty equivalent of a function z
1 

 1 where under a new probability measure. Using
the deﬁnition of 
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we are transforming the term inside the
bracket into an expectation under a new probability measure where the probabilities are







. Thus, we have transformed the




 1 > 1, then z
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 1 is convex. Observe that any random variable x and constant  , the
certainty equivalent of (x +  ) under a convex function is smaller than   plus the certainty







(x(s) +  )
1



















































< 1 is sufﬁcient to satisfy discounting. In particular it will
hold for  sufﬁciently close to 1 and Rsj bounded. The same argument can be shown to hold
for the recursion on y (s):
Final Step. To complete the proof one needs to modify Theorem 3.3 in Stokey et al. [1989]
from single-valued to two-valued functions. This is done by using a new norm by taking
38the max over the sup of each component. The rest of the proof is identical.
7.4 CRRA Preferences
One can follow the same steps as before to derive the operator for constant relative risk































































Provided that 1= = 
 = 1; preferences are log, as in KM. Replacing the solution for the
constrained guy, guessing and verifying: &s
t = &i





































8 Proof of Equity Market Clearing
We use the market clearing condition for out Is (s) and Id (s) and substitute in the policy
functions (1) and (2): We have that a solution at equality q must satisfy:





&i (r + qiK)=qR   (1   )K

(1   )
Clearing out K from both sides and using the deﬁnition of qi this expression becomes,





&i (r + q (1   ))   (1   &i)(1   )qR
(1   )qR
=
&i (r + q (1   ))
(1   q)
 
 (1   &i)
(1   )
(1   )
We get rid of the denominators and rearrange terms to obtain,
(1   )&
sr(1   q)   ((1   )(1   &
s) + )q (1   q)
 q&




From this equation we obtain a quadratic expression for q
(1   )&
sr   q(1   )&
sr   ((1   )(1   &
s) +  (1   ))q
+q
2 ((1   )(1   &












This inequality is characterized by a quadratic equation in q;
(q
)
2 A + q




(1   )(1   &
s)  














+ ((1   )(1   &




C =  (1   )&
sr
It is clear that C is negative. A pointwise inspection of A shows that this terms is also
negative provided that (1   &i) is arbitrarily close to (1   &s) to each other: By Assumption
2, (1 ) > 
(1 ) and by Proposition 3, for  sufﬁciently close to 1, (1   &i) is arbitrarily close
to (1   &s): This means that the ﬁrst term in the brackets is positive, so A will be negative.
For  sufﬁciently close to 1 again, B is also positive because,
(1   )(1   &
s)   
(1   &i)(1   )
(1   )
 > (1   )(1   &
s)(   (1   ))  0
Evaluated at 0, (26) is negative. It reaches a maximum at   B
2A > 0 and then will diverge to
 1: The discriminant (26) is also positive. Observe that,
40B = B1 + B2
where
B1 = ((1   )(1   &










So then, B2 > (1   )&sr and B1 >





B2   4AC > B2   4B1B2 = (B1   B2)
2 > 0: Thus, the roots (q1;q2)of (26) are both positive.
(20) is satisﬁed when (26) is negative. We let q2 be the greatest amongst these roots. There
are three cases:
Case1: If 1 > q1;thenq = 1theaggregateincentivecompatibilityconstraintisnotbinding
at q = 1.
Case 2: If 1 2 (q1;q2); then, q = 1 violates the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint.
Since for q > 1; constraints hold with equality, is must be the case that q = q2 is the unique
value of q satisfying the constraint (20)) at equality.
Case 3: If 1 < q1; (20)) does not bind and q = 1 once more.
419 Additional Extensions
9.1 Asset Pricing Properties
Liquidity shocks deliver interesting asset pricing properties. It is known from the asset
pricing literature that in order to obtain reasonable asset prices, the neoclassical growth
model needs signiﬁcant variation in q to generate a non-negligible equity premium. Liquid-
ity shocks cause variation in q without resorting to adjustment costs as in Jermann [1998].
Liquidity shocks also behave as a source of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. From Constan-
tinides and Dufﬁe [1996], we know these source of variation may explain part of the equity
premium. Tallarini [2000], shows that preferences that distinguish the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution from risk aversion help to explain the equity premium puzzle. Since
we extend the framework in KM beyond log-utility the model is placed in good footing.
Recent asset pricing models combine production adjustment costs with EZ preferences and
are capable of explaining asset prices(see for example Campanale et al. [2010] and Croce
[2009]). Since liquidity shocks have the potential to explain some asset pricing features, we
use asset prices to infer more about liquidity shocks.22 Finally, the model also delivers a
state-dependent liquidity premium which is interesting on its own.
As a benchmark, consider the price of riskless bond in zero net supply. Note saving
entrepreneurs determine the price of this asset. This follows since saving and investing
entrepreneurs cannot have their euler equations satisﬁed with equality at the same time
when q > 1. Since the return to private equity for investing entrepreneurs is higher, only
saving entrepreneurs will purchase a bond. Thus, the euler equation of the later should
determine pricing kernels.








































where Rs is the gross return of the portfolio of saving entrepreneurs. The stochastic discount
factor here is expressed as a function of marginal propensities to consume and the return to
the average portfolio. Hence the stochastic discount factor is given by:













































































22Since investment opportunities are random here, the model attempts to mimic lumpy investment. We
don’t introduce adjustment costs for this reason.
42The return to a riskless bond in zero net supply is given by Rb = E [t]
 1 : On the other hand,
the return to equity for the saving entrepreneur deﬁned in equation (11) can be decomposed






















This expression is convenient because it allows us to decompose the return on equity. The
ﬁrst term is the standard return on equity considering the depreciation. The second term re-
duces the return on equity by a liquidity component. With probability  a fraction (1   t+1)











































Hence, the private equity premium is obtained by the composition of two terms. These are,
ﬁrst a standard risk adjustment component:
cov((s0);(r(s0)+q(s0))=q(s))
E((s0)) and second, a liquidity






(1   t+1) and the stochastic discount factor. When liquidity constraints don’t bind, the sec-
ondtermvanishes. Thelowertheprobabilitythatconstraintsbindinthefuture, theliquidity
component will be smaller.
Liquidity Spectrum: The decomposition allows us to obtain a relation between pure risk
and liquidity. If particular asset’s return (in particular, in zero net supply) is correlated




payoff equivalent to E [Rs (s0)] minus the liquidity premium. Thus, we have a relation for
the expected returns of assets with different liquidity:
43Calibration Risk Free Rate Equity Premium Liquidity Premium
Baseline 1.1069 0.22419 0.022063
(2.14) (0.542) (0.625)
Table 4: Key asset prices computed from unconditional distribution.
Calibration Risk Free Rate Equity Premium Liquidity Premium
Baseline 1.02 0.23 0.0226
(2.74) (0.142) (0.0147)













Calibration Results: We assume, although not modeled explicitly, that the economy ex-
periences exogenous growth in labor productivity. For this reason, asset pricing formulas
are computed using a different value for  equal 0:991. A similar calibration is used in
Campanale et al. [2010]. Tables 4 and 5 describe the asset pricing properties of the model
corresponding to the unconditional distribution and the distribution conditional on binding
constraints. The ﬁrst column plots the expected returns of a risk free bond in zero net supply.
The baseline scenario predicts returns above 1.1% which is close to the average in the U.S..
In the constrained region, the risk free rate is slightly lower but also close to 1%. These ﬁg-
ures suggest that this rate does not vary much across regions. The volatility of the risk-free
rate is close to 2% which is slightly above the average for the U.S. economy. On the other
hand, the equity premium is 0.22% which is far below the premium found in the data, 7%.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the liquidity premium of equity is about 10% of the equity premium.
When liquidity shocks are more severe, that is, if we shift the support of  to the left,
the average risk-free rate falls. This suggests the behavior of the risk-free rate is tied to
the stationary distribution of the returns to equity. When liquidity shocks are stronger, the
stationarydistributionofcapitalshiftstotheleft, makingthereturntoequitylargerbutmore
volatileatthesametime. Risk-aversionmakestherisk-freeratesfall. Thishappensbecauseq
is on average higher, so the there is more variation in consumption. The volatility of returns
to equity also explains why @ needs to be large. With a low-correlation between aggregate
productivity and liquidity, the return to equity will ﬂuctuate due to changes in prices. By
increasing @, we are essentially lowering the conditional volatility of equity. Unfortunately,
the effect on the equity-premium operate in the opposite direction, so this explains why the
equity premium must be low, if the risk-free rate is close to 1. As opposed to Tallarini [2000],
the model presented entrepreneurs face a lot of idiosyncratic risk, although conditionally
the conditional volatility (on the agents type) of consumption is low.
449.2 Production Externality
We modify the model by introducing a production externality as in Brunnermeier and San-
nikov [2009]. We assume that labor is more efﬁcient as the aggregate capital stock grows.
In particular we assume that effective labor inputs are given by '(K)
1





 ; where  is a parameters that measures the degree of decreasing re-
turns to scale on the production externality.  K is a parameters that allows to normalize
the production externality to 1 when Kt =  K. The larger ; the larger the externality of
aggregate capital At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs take their own ﬁrms cap-
ital and the aggregate capital stock as given. They then, choose labor inputs optimally.
Production is carried out according to a Cobb-Douglas under a new production function
F (k;l)  k ('(K)l)




































The terms  () and  where deﬁned before. The last two equations are identical to equations
(15) and (16) except for the fact that wherever At showed up, no the term is interchanged by
'(K)At: This implies that the total factor productivity is affected by the aggregate capital
stock. The following assumption ensures that the capital stock is bounded.
Assumption 3.  1 and  > 1
This assumption is sufﬁcient to ensure that  + 1 2 (0;1) so that returns to aggregate
capital suffer diminishing returns to scale. The assumption that  > 1 is equivalent to saying
that the labor supply responds to less than 1-to-1 with respect to wage increments.  1
states that there are no increasing returns to scale in the production externality.
Main Implications The main implication of the production externality are its effect on
hours in the subsequent periods after the shock. Effectively, this externality works as if the
capital share of output where larger. The additional effect on output follows from a direct ef-
fect on the externality and the indirect effect on labor. The magnitude of the fall depends on
. The results aren’t substantially affected for the same calibration choice as in Brunnermeier
and Sannikov [2009].
9.3 Rare Liquidity Shocks
In this section we study a rare liquidity dry-up event in the model. We study the effects
of assume that a liquidity may dry-up entirely with a very low probability. To study these
45shocks, we adapt the Markov chain described in our baseline calibration in the following
way: we stack a 0 to the original liquidity shock space. We assume that there is a crisis state
xt such that liquidity shocks follow their regular process when xt = 1 and are set to 0 when






With these values, severe liquidity crises occur as rare and mildly persistent events. Thus,
we deﬁne the matrix ~ (a0;0)(a;) conditional on xt = 0: The entries are such that:
 (a0;0)(a;)  Prfat+1 = a
0;t+1 = 
0jat = a
0;t = ;xt = 0g
=

a0;a if 0 = 0
0 otherwise




  0:75 
 
0:01 
   0:25 
  

where  is the same as in the baseline calibration.
Main Implications The main implication of rare liquidity event is that introduces a more
prolonged effect on output as the capital stock takes longer to recover. In particular, q and
investment would react more slowly but the rest of the dynamics would mostly be the same
as in the baseline scenario.
10 Figures









































































































Figure 3: Value of Tobin’s Q along the state-space. The ﬁgure shows the value of q (solid),
qR (-.-) and qi (- -) as a functions of aggregate capita states for 4 combinations of aggregate
productivity and liquidity shocks. The ﬁgures show that at wedge exists the higher the
aggregate productivity shock or the tighter the liquidity shock. For all four cases, the wedge
is greater the lower the capital stock, reﬂecting that liquidity matters more, when returns are
higher.

















































































Investment Decomposion (Including Purchases)






























Savers (New Projects) Investors (New Projects) Savers (New and Old Projects) Investors (New − Sales) Aggregate
Figure 4: Investment along the state-space. The ﬁgure shows the value of the functions it
and ic
t as a functions of aggregate capita states for 4 combinations of aggregate productivity
and liquidity shocks. The ﬁgures show that liquidity constraints bind the higher the aggre-
gate productivity shock or the tighter the liquidity shock. For all four cases, constraints bind










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Invariant Distribution of Capital
Figure 7: Invariant Distributions. The ﬁgure shows the invariant distribution of capital the
capital stock.
51